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Introduction 
 
As financial transactions taxes (FTT) have moved to be part of the mainstream debate on tax policy, 
there has been increased attention to the incidence of such taxes. This is an important aspect to the 
debate, since the merits of the tax will depend to a substantial extent on who will end up bearing the 
burden. There are three key issues in making this assessment: 
1) Which groups directly bear the burden in the sense of carrying through trades that will be 
subject to the tax; 
2) The extent to which tax payments will be offset by a reduction in trading volume, which 
lowers transaction costs; and 
3) The extent to which reduced trading will lead to a less efficient allocation of capital, and 
therefore reduce growth and output. 
The issues associated with the first point are straightforward, even if the data may not be as clear as 
would be desirable. The allocation of the tax will be in proportion to the volume of trading by each 
income group, however, there are not reliable data for trading by income group. As a first 
approximation, it can be assumed that trading is proportional to the financial assets held by each 
income group. These data are available from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances. 
 
The second issue depends on the elasticity of trading volume with respect to the cost of trading. If 
trading is very responsive to changes in transactions costs, then reductions in trading volume can 
offset much or even all of the tax. Investors may have to pay the tax on trades they conduct, but 
they will save money on other transactions costs because they do less trading. There is research that 
provides evidence on trading elasticity, although it does leave a wide range of uncertainty. 
 
The third issue is the most important one. If the high current volume of trading is somehow leading 
to a better allocation of capital, then reducing trading volume will lead to a less efficient allocation of 
capital. In this case, FTTs will lead to slower growth and less output. Here, the incidence of the tax 
depends on the apportionment of this lower level of output. Insofar as it means lower returns to 
capital, households will lose if they own capital. Insofar as it means lower returns to labor (i.e. lower 
wages) households will lose if they have workers relying on labor income. 
 
This paper discusses these issues in further detail, assessing what the evidence shows on each issue. 
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Trading Volume by Income Group 
 
The Federal Reserve Board fields the Survey of Consumer Finances every three years. This survey is 
designed to produce estimates of the wealth and liabilities of households, with a breakdown by asset 
type. The most recent survey was fielded in 2013. Table 1 shows the breakdown of holdings of 
financial assets that could be subject to an FTT by income quintile with the top quintile spilt in half.1  
 
TABLE 1 
Average Holdings by Income Percentile 
(thousands of 2013 dollars) 
Percentile of 
Income 
Bonds Stocks Pooled 
Investment 
Funds 
Retirement 
Accounts 
Cash Value, 
Life 
Insurance 
Other 
Managed 
Assets 
Total 
Less than 20 * $2.3 $4.7 $3.8 $0.9 $1.2 $12.9 
20–39.9 $2.0 $3.5 $3.2 $11.6 $1.9 $3.5 $25.7 
40–59.9 $0.8 $7.9 $6.6 $36.1 $3.2 $4.3 $59.0 
60–79.9 $1.7 $14.3 $11.1 $86.2 $4.9 $11.6 $129.8 
80–89.9 * $33.1 $28.9 $185.1 $6.7 $21.3 $275.1 
90–100 $71.5 $315.2 $298.7 $530.2 $39.3 $131.2 $1,386.1 
Source and notes: Federal Reserve Board (2013). * indicates fewer than 10 people in the sample. 
 
The table shows that the holdings among the bottom two quintiles of most of the assets likely to be 
affected by an FTT are trivial. Few people in these income categories have any substantial amount of 
financial assets. Insofar as they have wealth, it typically is in the form of equity in their home. 
 
TABLE 2 
Share of Holdings by Income Percentile 
Percentile of 
Income 
Bonds Stocks Pooled 
Investment 
Funds 
Retirement 
Accounts 
Cash Value, 
Life 
Insurance 
Other 
Managed 
Assets 
Total 
Less than 20 * 1.2% 2.5% 0.8% 2.5% 1.3% 1.2% 
20–39.9 5.0% 1.7% 1.7% 2.3% 5.5% 3.6% 2.4% 
40–59.9 2.1% 3.9% 3.5% 7.3% 9.5% 4.4% 5.6% 
60–79.9 4.3% 7.1% 5.9% 17.4% 14.5% 11.9% 12.3% 
80–89.9 * 8.2% 7.6% 18.7% 9.9% 11.0% 13.0% 
90–100 88.6% 77.9% 78.9% 53.5% 58.0% 67.7% 65.5% 
Source and notes: Federal Reserve Board (2013). * indicates fewer than 10 people in the sample. 
 
                                                 
1  Federal Reserve Board (2013). The numbers in Table 1 were obtained by multiplying the percentage of families reported as 
holding each asset as shown in Table 6.13 of the 2013 Survey, but the means for those who hold the asset, as reported in Table 
6.13 means, both available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/scf2013_tables_internal_real.xls. 
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Table 2 shows the percentage of each asset class held by income quintile, along with a percentage 
for these six categories taken together. As a practical matter, some of these assets are more likely to 
be subject to an FTT than others, but as a first approximation, it is reasonable to sum them together, 
effectively assuming that the tax applies to them all equally. The top decile of the income 
distribution holds more than half of all the assets included, with the top quintile accounting for more 
than 80 percent of every asset except for retirement accounts and the cash value of life insurance. 
Overall, the top decile holds more than 65 percent of the listed assets, with the top quintile 
accounting for more than 78 percent.  
 
If the incidence of the tax is proportional to holdings, then clearly the top quintile will pay the 
overwhelming majority of the FTT. In fact, the shares shown in Table 2 likely understate the extent 
to which the incidence would fall on the top income decile since the assets held in substantial 
quantities by the lower quintiles — life insurance and retirement accounts — are likely to be less 
affected by an FTT than directly held assets. On the other side, this calculation does not include 
assets held by defined benefit pension funds, which would also be subject to the tax. Netting the 
two out, Table 2 likely gives a reasonable approximation of the distribution of the assets that will be 
subject to an FTT. 
 
 
Elasticity of Trading 
 
There have been several studies over the last few decades that have attempted to estimate the 
elasticity of trading volume with respect to the cost of trading.2 It is important to understand in this 
context that a FTT would be simply one component of the cost of trading. Investors also have to 
pay brokerage fees to the agents who actually put through the trade on their behalf. In addition, 
there is a bid-ask spread charged by the specialists who make the market in which they charge 
slightly more for selling a share of stock or other asset than they pay to buy it. This difference covers 
their costs, and their risk of holding an asset that is falling in price and will have to be sold for a 
lower price than they paid. The FTT is an addition to these other costs. 
 
These other transaction costs will vary hugely depending on the parties involved. They would be 
highest for a small investor who trades on his own behalf. This investor would be paying large 
commissions on each purchase and sale in addition to the bid-ask spread to the specialty trader. The 
                                                 
2  See Table 3. 
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costs would be somewhat lower for an individual investor who holds their stock or other assets 
through a large mutual fund. In this case, the mutual fund will have likely negotiated quantity 
discounts with traders so that the commissions are a small percentage of the price of the assets being 
traded. A large pension fund will be in the same position. However, the lowest cost traders would be 
professionals that trade on their own behalf, like high-frequency traders. These trades do not go 
through a middle man and, therefore, do not have to pay the bid-ask spread margin. 
 
These differences in trading costs are important, since a FTT will not have the same proportionate 
effect on trading costs for different actors in the market. A 0.1 percent tax may be 25 to 30 percent 
of the trading costs incurred by an individual with money in a mutual fund. It may be 70 to 80 
percent of the trading costs of high-frequency traders who are trading on their own behalf. If the 
elasticity of trading is the same for all traders, then a FTT will have by far the largest effect on the 
trading volume of high frequency traders and a much smaller effect on the trading volume of 
individuals with money in a mutual fund. 
 
While high frequency traders would almost certainly see the largest percentage drop in trading 
volume, it is not necessarily true that elasticities are the same for all traders. Typically the elasticity of 
an item declines as its price declines. When a product like a smart phone or flat screen television is 
expensive, a 20 percent drop in price is likely to lead to a larger percentage increase in sales than 
when the price is already low. For example, when flat screen televisions fell in price from $2,000 to 
$1,600 (a 20 percent decline), there was likely a large percentage increase in sales, since sales would 
have been small at such high prices. Currently, if the price of lower end flat screen televisions were 
to fall from $400 to $320, the percentage increase in flat screen sales is not likely to be very large. 
There are already many flat screen televisions being sold, so even a large increase in absolute 
numbers would not be a large percentage increase.3  
 
If we try to apply the same logic to trading, it is reasonable to believe that the elasticity of trading 
volume is actually greater with less frequent traders who face higher trading costs. For these traders, 
the tax will be a smaller percentage of their trading costs, but it could lead to a more than 
proportionate reduction in their trading volume. If a tax of 0.1 percent on a stock trade raised 
trading costs by a third, and if average turnover of stock fell from once every two years (50 percent 
                                                 
3  One of the positive aspects of an FTT is it will have the least impact on the trading volume of relatively illiquid assets, since it will 
be a smaller share of their current trading costs. In the case of a widely traded stock, like shares of GE, a 0.1 percent tax will be a 
substantial percentage of current trading cost. However a smaller company whose stock is typically only traded in small volumes 
will have a large bid-ask spread. In this case, a 0.1 percent tax would be a relatively small share of current trading costs and 
therefor have a limited effect on trading volume. 
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annually) to once every 32 months (37.5 percent annually), then the decline in trading volume would 
completely offset the higher cost per trade.4  
 
As a practical matter, we don’t have estimates on elasticities of trading volumes for different groups 
of traders, but there is no a priori reason for assuming that the elasticity for less frequent traders will 
be lower than the average for the market as a whole. Table 3 shows estimates of elasticities from a 
series of studies that were cited in a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper. 
 
TABLE 3 
Estimated Elasticities of Trading Volume with Respect to Transaction Costs 
 
Source and notes: From Matheson (2011), Table 5. 
 
In terms of overall elasticities, most of the studies find evidence that the elasticity of trading volume 
is greater than an absolute value of one. Based on this set of studies, the Tax Policy Center used -1.5 
as its central estimate of elasticity in calculating the incidence of the tax.5 It is probably fair to 
                                                 
4  Actually, in this scenario the fall in trading volume would more than offset the increase in costs. The investor is trading 66.7 
percent as much as before the tax, and paying 133.3 percent as much per trade. This would make total trading costs 88.7 percent 
as much as they had been previously. 
5  Burman, Leonard E. et al. (2015). 
 The Incidence of Financial Transactions Taxes 6 
 
conclude that most evidence points to the elasticity of trading as greater than one.6 This means that 
in response to the tax, trading volume on average will decline by a larger percentage than the tax 
increases trading costs. In total, then, the amount that people spend on trading will decline, rather 
than increase, as a result of the tax. As noted above, this does not imply that everyone will see their 
trading costs decline, but if the elasticity is greater than one, then on average trading costs will 
decline. This means that the loss of income for the financial industry due to reduced trading volume 
will actually exceed the amount of money raised through the tax.  
 
There is one other aspect to the measure of elasticity that is worth noting. Many financial products 
have the character of insurance. For example, a farmer selling a future against her crop is insuring 
that she will get a set price for her crop rather than taking the risk of what the market price will be 
when she actually has a crop to sell. Holders of corporate bonds may buy credit default swaps to 
protect against the risk that a company will go bankrupt. 
 
While it is generally desirable to insure against risk, there are often instances where we opt to not 
have insurance if the price is too high. Many tourists going to the coast in the summer buy hurricane 
insurance. This insurance reimburses them for the cost of the trip if a hurricane forces them to leave 
early. This is a type of insurance that is desirable to have, but if it were expensive few people would 
buy it.  
 
Similarly, financial products, like crop futures and credit default swaps, would be bought and sold in 
much smaller volumes if the cost were greater. For this reason, a FTT may not just reduce the 
volume of trading, but will also reduce the number of financial products actually created. There is 
some implicit cost in reducing the extent to which people insure themselves against bad outcomes, 
but presumably this cost is limited. The FTT is only raising the price of these forms of insurance, 
not making them unavailable. If the insurance provided by a futures contract or credit default swap 
had great value, then businesses or individuals would still buy them, even if the FTT had made them 
slightly more expensive. 
 
Of course investors also speculate in these products, for example buying futures with the 
expectation that the price of a product will rise or buying credit default swaps with the expectation a 
company will go into bankruptcy. A FTT will certainly have the effect of reducing this sort of 
speculation, which will also have the effect of reducing the number of derivatives that are created. 
 
                                                 
6  It is worth noting in this respect that total trading costs have increased relative to the size of the economy for the last four 
decades even as the cost per trade has fallen sharply. This further supports the view that the elasticity of trading is greater than 
one. 
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The Volume of Trading and the Efficient 
Allocation of Capital 
 
A FTT that raises any substantial amount of money will clearly lead to large reductions in trading 
volume. A key question is whether such a reduction in trading volume will be associated with a 
worse allocation of capital, and therefore slower growth and reduced output, or whether the 
reduction in volume will simply be eliminating useless trading. In the latter case, the trading is 
helping to allocate capital to its best uses. In the former case, the trading has little or nothing to with 
the best allocation of capital and could even lead to its misallocation.  
 
In the latter case, we can think of the trading that will be eliminated as a result of a FTT as being 
comparable to having a lottery. The lottery itself does not generate anything productive for the 
economy; it simply redistributes money from the losers to the winners. If we tax the lottery, fewer 
people will play the lottery, but there is no loss to the economy from fewer lottery tickets being sold. 
(This assumes people only care about winning the lottery and don’t enjoy the process of playing the 
lottery.)  
 
If a large percentage of current financial transactions is like the lottery, then eliminating them will 
not impair the operation of the economy. This means that the only costs associated with the tax 
would be the money that investors have to pay, net of their reduction in other trading costs. On the 
other hand, if the trading is important to the proper allocation of capital, then reducing it will have 
the effect of lowering growth and GDP. There are good reasons for believing the waste view.  
 
There has been some research in the last few years which found that a large financial sector was 
associated with slower economic growth. A 2012 study by Stephan Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi, 
two researchers at the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), analyzed the link between growth 
and the size of the financial sector across 50 wealthy and developing countries.7 It found that a larger 
financial sector seems to foster growth up to a certain point. After achieving an optimal size relative 
to the size of the economy, the financial sector acted as drag on growth when it grew larger. 
 
                                                 
7  Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012). 
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The study looked at industry level data from a smaller sample of wealthy countries. It found that 
industries that were the most dependent on external financing and that were heaviest in research and 
development spending were the ones that were most likely to experience slower productivity growth 
in countries with rapidly growing financial sectors. 
 
There is a plausible explanation for this pattern. In the first case, if a bloated financial sector is 
pulling away capital that could otherwise have gone to productive investment, then it makes sense 
that the most affected sectors would be the ones that need external financing. The companies that 
can generate all the money they need for investment from their own profits may not be hurt much 
by an over-sized financial sector. 
 
In the case of research and development intensive industries, the financial sector should be viewed 
as a competitor for talent. If there are a lot of high paying jobs for people with good math and 
technical skills in finance, then they are less likely to be working in designing software. 
 
Following Cecchetti and Kharroubi, the reduction of trading volume associated with a FTT would 
lessen the extent to which the financial sector was pulling away highly skilled individuals from 
productive sectors of the economy. If the ability of the financial sector to allocate capital effectively 
was not impaired by this reduction in trading volume, then the effect of the tax on growth would be 
positive.  
 
A recent analysis by the IMF also found a similar relationship between the size of the financial 
sector and growth.8 While a larger financial sector was associated with stronger growth in developing 
countries, a very large financial sector appeared to slow growth. In this analysis, a larger financial 
sector did not impede capital accumulation; rather, it was associated with lower multifactor 
productivity growth, implying that capital was not being directed to its best uses. 
 
The idea that an overgrown financial sector can be a drag on growth is consistent with the analysis 
in Philippon (2014) which finds that the unit cost of intermediation has remained unchanged since 
1900.9 This result is counter-intuitive since it would be expected that enormous advances in 
computers and information technology would have led to a sharp reduction in the cost of 
intermediation. However, whatever savings have been realized as a result of improvements in 
technology appear to have been offset by an increase in the volume of services associated with 
intermediation. While these services may provide some value, it is not obvious what it would be. 
 
                                                 
8  Sahay et al. (2015). 
9  Philippon (2014). 
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Finally, on a theoretical level, it is worth noting that growth models generally do not include a 
transaction cost term. In other words, most growth models assume that increased output depends 
on the amount and quality of labor and capital and the overall level of technology. They do not 
assume a speedup of growth associated with a decline in transactions costs. (Certainly it would be 
difficult to find evidence of any such speedup over the last four decades, as noted in the earlier 
discussion.) If there was not an expectation that a decline in transactions costs would lead to an 
acceleration of the rate of growth, then it is not obvious why we should expect an increase in 
transactions costs associated with a FTT to lead to slower growth.  
 
In short, there is good reason to believe that the lottery model accurately captures much of the 
trading in U.S. financial markets. Traders are hoping to gain at each other’s expense in a zero sum 
game. Reducing the resources devoted to this activity has little impact on the ability of the financial 
markets to effectively allocate capital. Instead it is likely to lead to a boost in growth by diverting 
resources from this zero sum game to productive sectors of the economy.  
 
From this perspective, the incidence of the tax should simply be the actual change in trading 
expenses incurred by each income group. If anything, the shift of resources away from finance may 
imply a greater level of growth and income to be allocated among households. 
 
 
Incidence of the Tax by Income Group 
 
Table 4 assumes that there is no change to GDP as a result of the tax. It shows the incidence by 
income group assuming that trading volume is proportionate to the assets held. It shows a low 
elasticity scenario (-0.75), a middle elasticity scenario (-1.0), and a high elasticity scenario (-1.5). In 
each case, the calculations follow the Tax Policy Center analysis in assuming a 0.061 percent average 
transactions costs for assets subject to the tax.10  
 
 
                                                 
10  This transactions cost figure was obtained by calculating the transactions cost that would result in the decline in trading volume 
assumed in Table 4 for a tax of 0.1 percent. This calculation would be only an approximation since it constructs an average 
transactions cost for assets, when in fact there are large differences in the cost for different types of assets. The transactions costs 
for equities are almost an order of magnitude greater than the transactions costs for derivatives. The per family tax by quintile in 
the event of no change in trading was calculated by taking the Tax Policy Center’s estimate for the revenue collected if there was 
not decline in trading volume ($214.3 billion) and dividing this by the number of families represented by the SCF (122.5 million). 
This gives an average tax of $1,749 per family. This was adjusted in accordance with the percentage of the average wealth held by 
a family in each income group relative to the overall average ($211,600). 
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TABLE 4 
Average Cost of 0.1 Percent FTT by Income Percentile 
(2013 dollars) 
Percentile of 
Income 
Low elasticity (-0.75) Middle elasticity (-1.0) High elasticity (-1.5) 
 
Tax w/o 
change in 
volume 
Percent 
reduction 
in 
volume 
Implied 
reduction 
in other 
trading 
costs 
Net 
change in 
trading 
costs 
Tax w/o 
change in 
volume 
Percent 
reduction 
in 
volume 
Implied 
reduction 
in other 
trading 
costs 
Net 
change in 
trading 
costs 
Tax w/o 
change in 
volume 
Percent 
reduction 
in 
volume 
Implied 
reduction 
in other 
trading 
costs 
Net 
change in 
trading 
costs 
Less than 20 $106.8 51.7% $33.7 $17.9 $106.8 62.1% $40.5 $0.0 $106.8 74.6% $48.6 -$21.5 
20–39.9 $212.3 51.7% $67.0 $35.6 $212.3 62.1% $80.4 $0.0 $212.3 74.6% $96.6 -$42.7 
40–59.9 $488.1 51.7% $153.9 $81.8 $488.1 62.1% $184.9 $0.0 $488.1 74.6% $222.1 -$98.1 
60–79.9 $1,073.0 51.7% $338.4 $179.9 $1,073.0 62.1% $406.4 $0.0 $1,073.0 74.6% $488.3 -$215.7 
80–89.9 $2,274.5 51.7% $717.3 $381.3 $2,274.5 62.1% $861.6 $0.0 $2,274.5 74.6% $1,035.1 -$457.3 
90–100 $11,459.0 51.7% $3,613.8 $1,920.9 $11,459.0 62.1% $4,340.8 $0.0 $11,459.0 74.6% $5,214.5 -$2,304.0 
Source and notes: Federal Reserve Board (2013), Burman et al. (2015), and author’s calculations. 
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As can be seen, only in the low elasticity scenario will investors on average pay any portion of the 
tax, after netting out their savings on other trading costs. By construction, in the middle scenario 
with an elasticity of -1, the decline in trading costs exactly offsets the amount of tax revenue paid, so 
that total trading costs are not changed by the tax. In the high elasticity scenario, the reduction in 
other trading costs exceed the revenue collected from the tax, which means that the financial sector 
will bear the full burden of the tax.11 
 
Even in the low elasticity scenario, the impact for most households will be limited due to their 
relatively small asset holdings. For the bottom quintile, the average cost would be $17.90 a year. 
Even for the fourth quintile the cost would be on average just $179.90 per household. In short, the 
vast majority of households would see almost no burden from an FTT even in this low elasticity 
scenario. It is also worth noting that in this low elasticity scenario, the implied revenue from the tax 
is over $100 billion a year. 
 
If the elasticity is higher, as most research indicates, their tax payments will be fully offset by a 
reduction in other trading costs. Using the elasticity assumption from Tax Policy Center’s analysis, a 
family in the second quintile would see a decline in their annual trading costs of $43. A family in the 
fourth quintile would see a decline in their annual trading costs of $216. The sharpest reduction in 
trading costs would be for the highest income families, since they had been doing the most trading. 
 
In short, if the elasticity of trading is greater than one (in absolute value) then the reduction in 
trading costs will exceed the amount of revenue raised through the tax. The financial sector will bear 
the full brunt of the tax in the form of less revenue from trading.12 Whether or not there is a burden 
to the rest of the economy will depend on whether the lost trades affect the efficiency of the 
allocation of capital across the economy. If this is unaffected, then the revenue raised through the 
tax comes entirely at the expense of the financial sector. 
 
  
                                                 
11  The implied savings from lower transactions costs cannot be simply deducted from the base tax revenue to get the net cost to 
investors, since the tax revenue will be much lower after factoring in the drop in trading volume. 
12  The calculations here may understate the losses to the financial sector since they assume that the full cost of the tax is passed on 
to investors. It is possible that reductions in trading volume of the size implied by these calculations could result in lower margins 
per trade, as financial intermediaries are forced to accept lower fees. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the incidence of a financial transactions tax based on the holdings of financial 
assets by income group. It shows that the reduction in trading costs associated with reduced trading 
volume as a result of the tax will largely offset the cost of the tax even if trading is relatively inelastic. 
If trading is elastic, then the cost of the tax will be born in full by the financial industry in the form 
of reduced revenue. Whether or not there is any impact to the rest of the economy will depend on 
the extent to which the reduction in trading volume affects the efficiency of the allocation of capital. 
If the allocation of capital does become less efficient as a result of reduced trading volume then the 
financial industry will bear the full burden of the tax.  
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